By • 8/28/09
The last article on White America examined John Rawls’ theory of justice as part of my project of formulating a political philosophy for the pro-white movement. This article will deepen and refine our understanding of Rawls’ theory of justice and also introduce his theory of ethics. The major question to be addressed is why we should be just at all rather than unjust.
By justice, Rawls means the moral principles that apply to social institutions, such as the government, the courts, and the economic regime: he calls the totality of social institutions the “basic structure” of a society. The theory of justice is only one branch of moral philosophy, or the general study of principles of right and wrong. Another branch of moral philosophy is ethics, which deals with the morality of individual behavior—commonsensical prohibitions against lying and breaking promises are examples of ethical rules.
You may be wondering why I am devoting so much attention to a philosopher whose liberalism would have led him to reject everything the pro-white movement stands for. For now, you must accept my promise that appreciating Rawls will pay off as we progress. Rawls will aid us in formulating a concept of morality, which is crucial to a political philosophy for a number of reasons. For example:
The last article described Rawls’ method for establishing the principles of justice. People naturally want social goods, like rights, liberties, opportunities, wealth, and self-respect. A theory of justice describes how to set up the basic structure of society so that these goods are distributed fairly. Just principles are those that a group of impartial people would choose to live by. To be impartial in choosing principles means giving equal consideration to the good of everyone affected by them without being biased towards one’s own good. In order to illustrate what impartiality means, Rawls uses the thought experiment of the original position, in which the parties to his social contract decide on principles through the veil of ignorance. Rawls’ method for formulating principles of justice can be reduced to a simple maxim: “Act on principles that impartial people would choose to live by.”
Rawls believes that his method for defining principles of justice can also be applied to other fields of moral philosophy, including ethics. The parties to the social contract can just as well decide on the principles that should regulate individual behavior as on principles of justice.
Since Rawls is primarily concerned with justice, his remarks on ethics are brief, but nevertheless extremely rich. He argues that the parties to the social contract would decide that people had certain “natural duties” to one another. One of these is the duty of justice, or the duty to comply with just institutions and to work to establish just arrangements where they do not yet exist. The duty of justice demands not merely that we obey just laws, but that we actively work to make our society a more just place. For example, citizens have a duty to vote for the political party whose policies seem to conform best to the principles of justice, rather than out of self-interest.1
Furthermore, individuals have a duty of mutual respect. This duty is exceptionally important in the context of Rawls’ broader philosophy. As noted in my last article, Rawls considers self-respect, or the conviction that what one is doing with one’s life is worth doing, to be the most precious of all the social goods. Self-respect is founded on the respect of others—it is difficult, if not impossible, to respect yourself if no one else respects you. Consequently, the duty of mutual respect is crucial to the happiness of society. This duty requires that we be make an effort to see the situation of others from their point of view, that we be prepared to explain our actions to those who are affected by them, and that we be courteous to others.2
The Rawlsian maxim also results in a duty of mutual aid. We should be willing to do each other favors, especially if they are no great trouble to us. Rawls gives no examples of mutual aid, but it is not too hard to think of them: lending money to friends in need, provided they are trustworthy; jumping a stranger’s battery if it has gone dead; giving up one’s seat to the elderly on the subway. Rawls points out that providing aid to others is often in our long-term self-interest, as aid is may be reciprocated. However, this is not the primary justification of the duty of natural aid. Rather, a society that publicly recognizes this duty is one in which we can be confident of other people’s good intentions towards us. Besides, mutual aid is a sign of respect: a society that does not recognize this duty is one that expresses “an indifference if not disdain for human beings that would make a sense of our own worth impossible.”3
Rawls lists other duties as well but does not discuss them: the duty not to harm innocent people and the duty not to be cruel.4
Not only does Rawls describe our duties, but also our obligations. Whereas duties apply to citizens generally, obligations are imposed on us by our voluntary associations. Anyone who benefits from an association, whether it be social institution, a political party, a marriage, a contract, or even just a game, is obligated to comply with the terms of that association, provided that the terms are just. Essentially, our obligations prevent us from free-riding on the efforts of others once we enter into an association: “We are not to gain from the cooperative efforts of others without doing our fair share.”5 Thus, for example, a politician who is granted special powers and status by the choice of voters is obligated to do his best to serve the voters’ interests. Someone who plays a game is obligated to abide by the rules of the game and to be a good sport.6
For Rawls, then, to be moral requires that you abide by the principles of justice, the natural duties, and the obligations that your voluntary associations impose on you.
We do not owe moral behavior unconditionally to individuals or to institutions. Rather, Rawls believes in reciprocity when it comes to morality: one owes moral behavior only to people and institutions that are themselves moral. When laws are plainly unjust, for example, one has the right not to comply with them. Civil disobedience and even outright revolution are legitimate in an unjust social order.7
Moreover, a just state has a right to suppress social movements or parties that advocate unjust policies: “Justice does not require that men stand idly by while others destroy the basis of their existence.”8 Thus, for example, a just state is entitled to suppress an intolerant religious sect if it threatens to gain significant political power. Rawls would no doubt also believe that a state would be justified in suppressing a movement that sought to gain a privileged status for any race.
However, Rawls always prescribes restraint in efforts to fight injustice, whether by citizen organizations protesting unjust laws or by the just state in confronting unjust political movements. Citizen organizations are justified in taking extreme measures like civil disobedience and revolution only in cases of “substantial and clear injustice,” such as serious restrictions of the basic liberties or of equal opportunity. Moreover, all legal means for protest must have been tried. Finally, extreme measures are justified only when it can be plausibly argued that they will make society more just. A form of protest that will result in the breakdown of law and order is likely to make society a more unjust place, which defeats the purpose of the protest. In such cases, citizens would be well advised to forego extreme measures.9
Similarly, the state is justified in suppressing the rights of unjust social movements only if the state is seriously threatened. An intolerant religious sect could be denied the right to speech and assembly for example “only when the tolerant sincerely and with reason believe that their own security and that of the institutions of liberty are in danger.”10
The same principle of reciprocity applies to ethics as well. We owe the duties of aid and respect only to those people who can be counted on to reciprocate them. By no means should we feel required to act respectfully towards those who do not respect us.
During conversations about Rawls’ philosophy, including with commenters on the last article, some have asked me why we should respect justice in the first place. Why shouldn’t we act out of simple self-interest or in the interests of racial power?
Since I am formulating a philosophy for the pro-white movement, I naturally agree that whites should act in their racial interest, though we must be careful to define an ethical conception of the racial interest. However, because I want to get as much out of Rawlsian philosophy as possible, I am going to put my own opinions aside and answer this question as a Rawlsian would. In making a case for his theory, Rawls emphasizes that a just society will be stable system of cooperation and foster self-respect.11 My answer is a fairly free-handed interpretation of those points.
Those who believe that we should construct a state based on self-interest or racial interest would argue that the ideal society is an unjust one that is biased either towards the self or a given ethnicity. Thus, each person should work to make himself dictator or set up an ethnically based caste system.
It would even seem to follow from Rawls’ own assumptions that each individual try to create a society in which he himself is a dictator. After all, if people naturally seek their own good, as Rawls believes, why shouldn’t we try to create a society in which everyone serves our good, rather than their own?
I will begin by remarking that, however implausible it may seem that rulers of unjust societies would accept justice, they have in fact done so often in history. Many is the case in which a dictator, an aristocracy, or a ruling racial caste has voluntarily given up its privilege and consented to liberal democracy.
Rawlsians believe that unjust societies are not really in anyone’s interest. Rather, it is rational to act justly because doing so is in our long-term, or enlightened, self-interest. Naturally, justice requires sacrificing our interests in the short term. It is not in a ruler’s short-term self-interest to tolerate the expression of political views that are hostile to his rule or to allow fair elections when it is likely that he will lose. Nevertheless, it is rational to pay these short-term costs if they result in greater benefits down the road. A plausible argument can be made that a just society does result in such long-term benefits, in particular, stability, security, and prosperity.
Why is a just society a stable one? When goods are distributed fairly, people are more likely to be reconciled to their lot in life and to accept the social order. A Rawlsian society is set up with the interests of the least advantaged in mind. Even if there are inequalities in possession of wealth and other social goods, those inequalities exist because they are to the greatest advantage of the least advantaged. The poor, consequently, have no legitimate grievances. More broadly, the social goods are distributed as fairly as possible to everyone in the society.12 If anyone grouses about his lack of social goods, the state can explain to him that he could not have more without impinging on the legitimate expectations of others.
However, when social goods are distributed in an unfair manner, those who are treated unfairly do have legitimate grievances against the social order. They are not morally obligated to comply with the law and are even justified in overturning the state. The lesson of history seems to prove Rawls right here. Blatantly unfair societies, like dictatorships or caste systems, are highly prone to revolution and other forms of instability.
In an unjust society, the ruling class is, therefore, in an insecure position, and it might be rational for rulers to put just institutions into place in order to curb the threat of revolution. There is a broader sense in which the just society is a highly secure one. In an unjust society of great inequalities, the highly placed must always fret about the future, for it is possible that either they themselves or their families will fall from grace and suffer the miserable fate of the lower orders, who are deprived not only of wealth, but also of opportunity and rights. However, in a just society in which inequalities are minimized, even the lot of the worst off is not too bad, so there is less reason to worry about the future.
Another advantage of a just and stable society is that it is more likely to be prosperous than an unjust one because it is favorable to economically beneficial cooperation. Naturally, the social instability resulting from injustice makes doing business difficult, as any enterprise could be upset by the overthrow of the state or other violence.
Besides, in a society in which people have no legitimate grievances against the social order, people are likely to look benevolently and trustfully, rather than with resentment, on their fellow citizens. Justice is conducive to ethical behavior: when one is respected and aided by the state, one is more likely to respect and aid others. Effective social norms requiring mutual respect and aid also promote trust, as they forbid lying, the breaking of promises, and stealing.
There is a substantial body of research that links economic prosperity, as well as a number of other social goods, to trust. Social scientists call networks of trust “social capital.” It is not surprising that businesses tend to thrive in societies with high levels of social capital. One difficulty of doing business is what economists call “transaction costs,” the costs of monitoring, contracting, adjudicating, and enforcing business agreements. In a trusting society, such transaction costs are low, as business partners do not require much monitoring and do not need to take each other to court very often for breach of contract. Reducing the costs of business also results in a reduction of the risks of starting new businesses, so a just society would be highly economically innovative.13
A just society would be a very happy one. As we have seen, Rawls considers self-respect, which is founded on the respect of others, to be the greatest social good. By guaranteeing the greatest freedom possible to all citizens, the just society demonstrates its respect for them. Granting freedom to people implies that you are confident that they are capable of making rational and moral choices on their own. Freedom, in other words, is a sign of respect for people’s rationality and moral powers.
Rawlsians can, in sum, argue that justice brings such substantial and extensive benefits to a society that it is in the enlightened self-interest of everyone, even the rulers of an unjust state.
Rawls’ moral philosophy is extremely impressive. It is clear and logical: moral principles are deduced from a simple maxim. It is extensive: it can account for moral problems as different as access to voting rights and subway etiquette. It conforms to common sense: it is, after all, commonsensical to most people that we should show courtesies to each other and guarantee universal rights. Finally, it is plausible that Rawlsian morality would have highly beneficial effects.
And yet there is clearly something deeply fallacious about Rawls’ philosophy. As we shall see in the next article, Rawls believed that the moral powers of mankind were so strong that people would voluntarily consent to live morally once a just society was established. This conclusion does follow logically from Rawls’ broader argument. After all, if morality is in everyone’s enlightened self-interest, why would we ever commit a crime or even treat anyone rudely? And yet, when one looks at the world, with all of its wars, disrespect of basic rights, economic inequalities, and general acrimony, one must doubt Rawls’ optimism. The moral powers do not seem to be as strong in man as Rawls believed, and many people seem to have a very different opinion of where their interests lie.
A world in which the moral powers are weak requires a very different moral theory. In Rawls’ world, the moral society naturally and almost effortlessly flourishes. However, in the real world, it is difficult to create even a moderately moral society, and, once it is set up, it must be zealously defended against mankind’s natural tendency to immorality. Moreover, if the races differ in morality, preserving a moral society may require treating the races differently. It is through this line of thinking that I will begin to address the questions about race raised in the Prologue article.